Quantifying pervasive authentication: the case of the Hancke-Kuhn
  protocol by Pavlovic, Dusko & Meadows, Catherine
ar
X
iv
:0
91
0.
57
45
v3
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
4 J
ul 
20
10
Quantifying pervasive authentication:
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Abstract
As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication
patterns are becoming insufficient: besides entity authentication, many
applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting pro-
tocols have been proposed and implemented to provide such strengthened
forms of authentication, but there are very few proofs that such protocols
satisfy the required security properties. In some cases, the proofs can
be provided in the symbolic model. More often, various physical factors
invalidate the perfect cryptography assumption, and the symbolic model
does not apply. In such cases, the protocol cannot be secure in an abso-
lute logical sense, but only with a high probability. But while probabilistic
reasoning is thus necessary, the analysis in the full computational model
may not be warranted, since the protocol security does not depend on
any computational assumptions, or on attacker’s computational power,
but only on some guessing chances.
We refine the Dolev-Yao algebraic method for protocol analysis by
a probabilistic model of guessing, needed to analyze protocols that mix
weak cryptography with physical properties of nonstandard communica-
tion channels. Applying this model, we provide a precise security proof
for a proximity authentication protocol, due to Hancke and Kuhn, that
uses probabilistic reasoning to achieve its goals.
1 Introduction
Two paradigms of security. Traditionally, two paradigms have been used
for proving protocol security. The first one, captured by the symbolic model,
commonly known as “Dolev-Yao”, describes both protocol and attacker in terms
of an algebraic theory [16]. While this has been criticized as crude, it is often
highly effective and easily automated. The other paradigm, captured by the
computational model, usually relies on some notion of indistinguishability from
the point of view of a computationally limited attacker [20]. Recently, a lot of
research [3, 38], starting with [1], has been devoted to drawing the two paradigms
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closer together. This strategy has generally been to rely upon crypto-algorithms
that themselves satisfy strong enough definitions of security, so that, if used in
the proper way, they can be treated as Dolev-Yao “black boxes”.
Problem of pervasive security. However, there is an emerging class of secu-
rity protocols for which it seems difficult to bring these two paradigms together.
Such protocols arise in heterogenous networks of diverse computational and
communication devices, with mixed type channels between them [40]. Nowa-
days ubiquitous, such networks can be viewed as a realization of Doug Engel-
bart’s visionary idea of smart space and pervasive computation [18]. The spatial
aspects of computation give rise to a new family of security problems, where
the standard authentication requirements need to be strengthened by proofs
of spatial proximity. In some cases, it has been possible to refine symbolic
methods to get stronger proofs [27, 35]. But there are other cases that resist
symbolic analysis.One such case is the Hancke-Kuhn distance bounding protocol
[23], which we analyze in the present paper. The protocol consists of a timed
challenge-response exchange in which a prover Peggy needs to convince a verifier
Victor that she is in the vicinity. Peggy’s rapid response to Victor’s challenge
is implemented using a rapidly computable function. The requirement that
the function must be rapidly computable turns out to weaken it cryptographi-
cally. One of the main requirements of cryptographic strength is diffusion: for
a boolean function, each bit of the output should depend on each bit of the
input [39]. But a function that has to wait for the last bit of its input before it
produces the first bit of its output is not rapidly computable. The other way
around, an on-line function, that produces its output while still receiving its
input, is easier to compute, but cannot be cryptographically strong. So there is
a tradeoff between cryptographic strength and rapid computability. We explore
this tradeoff in Sec. 5, and quantify the information leakage of on-line functions.
The Hancke-Kuhn protocol is based on such a function.
Already in the original presentation [23] of their protocol, Hancke and Kuhn
wrote down an estimate of the attacker’s chance to guess a response bit. How-
ever, besides attempting to guess some bits of the response, the attacker may
also attempt to guess the secret on which the response is based. Moreover, he
may attempt his guesses directly, or make use of the responses stored from other
sessions. Last but not least, he may collude with Peggy. Towards a precise se-
curity proof, the diverse strategies available to the attacker must be evaluated
together, and exhaustively. This requires a formal model of protocol execution.
Bayesian security. But what model to use? The symbolic model cannot be
used because the perfect cryptography assumption is not validated by the on-
line function, which is the central feature of the protocol. On the other hand,
the cryptographic strength and weakness of this function, and the resulting
security and insecurity of their protocol, does not have anything to do with any
computational assumptions, or with the computational power of the adversary:
it only depends on guessing chances, which cannot be essentially increased by
computational power. Thus using the computational model does not contribute
to the analysis of the central feature of the protocol, although it does apply to
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any implementation.
The most natural model for analyzing the Hancke-Kuhn protocol that we
came up with extends the symbolic model by a rudimentary probabilistic the-
ory of guessing. It retains the perfect cryptography assumption for the standard
cryptographic primitives used in the protocol, in particular for the keyed hash
function. In a probabilistic context, though, the perfect cryptography assump-
tion means that the output distributions of the relevant cryptographic primitives
are statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. Assuming this
for the hash function used in the protocol brings us close to the random oracle
assumption, often used in computational analyses [4]. There is a sense in which
the random oracle assumption can be construed as the probabilistic version of
the perfect cryptography assumption.
In summary, we contend that the simplest model capturing the central fea-
tures of the Hancke-Kuhn authentication protocol must be probabilistic, but
need not be computational. The probabilistic model that we propose is an ex-
tension of the symbolic theories used in our previous work [26, 8, 28]. On the
other hand, a version of the standard computational model can be obtained as
an extension of this probabilistic model (by distinguishing a submonoid of feasi-
ble functions within our monoid of randomized boolean functions). It should be
noted that these logical maps between the models go in the opposite direction
from those in the explorations of the computational soundness of the various
fragments of the symbolic model [1, 3, 38]. In such explorations, the symbolic
languages are mapped (interpreted) in the computational language; here, a more
concrete model is mapped onto a more abstract model, which is its quotient,
just like blocks of low-level code are mapped onto the expressions of a high-level
programming language, or like more concrete state machines are mapped on
more abstract state machines [29, 30]. It follows that anything proven about
the abstract model remains valid about its more concrete implementations: e.g.,
the Bayesian reasoning about secrecy remains valid in the computational model
— provided that the assumed randomness of the hash function can be vali-
dated. This proviso is, of course, not satisfied in practice, since cryptographic
hash functions are not truly random. The task, thus, remains to strengthen
or refine the reasoning as to be able to discharge such unrealistic assumptions.
This logical strategy was discusssed in [26, 8]. While not widely accepted in
security, this is a standard approach to refinement based software development:
e.g., Euclid’s algorithm is usually described assuming the ring of integers; but
the assumption that there are infinitely many integers must be discharged before
the algorithm is implemented in a real computer.
The space does not allow us to delve into the details of this approach, as
applied to security. They will be presented elsewhere. In the present paper,
we attempt to present a very special instance of this approach, where a modest
probabilistic extension of the symbolic model suffices for the problem at hand
— yet it leads to an essentially different reasoning framework, with bayesian
derivations instead of logical. The resulting technical divergence, mitigated by
the conceptual guidance from the underlying simpler model, should be viewed as
one of the main features of the incremental approach, pursued in the Protocol
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Derivation Logic (PDL) [26, 8, 28]. In [27], PDL was already used to ana-
lyze distance bounding protocols, similar to Hancke-Kuhn’s, and for reasoning
about pervasive security in general. An interesting feature of the current prob-
abilistic extension of PDL is that the concept of guards, originally developed
for reasoning about secrecy [28], now provides a crucial stepping stone into our
analysis of guessing chances, and of the concrete authentication guarantees in
the Hancke-Kuhn protocol in Sec. 6, as well as in the abstract view of symbolic
authentication in Thm. 3.4.
Related work. As already mentioned, the closest relative of the PDL formal-
ism, underlying this work, and briefly summarized in Sec. 3, is PCL [17, 13, 12].
Both formalisms owe a lot to strand spaces [19], in spirit, and in execution mod-
els, although the logical methods diverge. Our probabilistic extension of PDL is
predated by the probabilistic extension of PCL in [14], and by the probabilistic
extension of strand spaces in [22]. But each of the three probabilistic approaches
has a different intent, and a completely different implementation, conceptually
and technically. It would be interesting to explore these differences more closely,
as some tasks may yield to combined modeling methods.
Paper outline. The paper continues with a review of distance bounding au-
thentication, and a description of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol. In Sec. 3 we
provide a brief overview of the derivational method of protocol analysis, and of
PDL. We also recall the algebraic notions of derivability and guards, originally
used for derivational analyses of secrecy, and here adapted for authenticity. The
probabilistic versions of these notions are introduced in Sec. 4, and then used
to model guessing. The gathered tools are then put to use. In Sec. 5, we an-
alyze the information leakage of on-line functions in general, and characterize
the Hancke-Kuhn function among them. In Sec. 6, we quantify the authenti-
cation achieved in the Hancke-Kuhn protocol. Sec. 7 closes the paper with a
summary of the results and a discussion of the extensions. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 The Hancke-Kuhn protocol
2.1 Background
In a man-in-the-middle attack on a challenge-response protocol, the attacker
relays messages, sometimes modified, between the legitimate participants. If
resending a message takes time, the legitimate participants may observe slower
traffic. This has been proposed as a method to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks. In particular, the challenger can measure the presumed round trip of
his challenge and of responder’s response, and compute a maximal distance of
the responder, assuming an upper bound on the message velocity. This can
assure the authenticity of the response, if it is known that the attacker cannot
be too close. This is the idea of distance bounding [15, 5]. The early security
analyses of distance bounding protocols go back to the early 1990s [6]. The
interest in this type of authentication re-emerged recently, with the task of
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device pairing and a genuine need for proximity authentication in pervasive
networks [34, 7, 10, 23, 24, 27, 37, 9, etc.]. From the outset, the basic idea
of distance bounding was to combine some cryptographic authentication tools,
such as hashes or signatures, with a physical constraint, such as the limited speed
of message exchange. Most distance bounding protocols [6, 7, 27] implement this
combination by using two channel types: the standard network channels for the
cryptographic authentication, and the timed channels for the rapid response.
The Hancke-Kuhn protocol [23] stands out by it simplicity, and by the fact that
both cryptographic data and the rapid response are sent on the timed channel.
This, however, comes for the price of information leakage, which makes the
security analysis interesting.
2.2 The protocol
As mentioned before, the goal of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol is that the prover
Peggy proves to the verifier Victor that she is nearby. It is assumed that Peggy
and Victor share a long term secret s, and a public hash function H . The
relevant security requirement from H will turn out to be a version of the range
preimage resistance [33]. The simplest way to present a protocol session is to
view it in two stages.
In the first stage, Peggy and Victor exchange values a and b, which can be
predictable for the attacker, but must never be reused by Peggy and Victor
in more than one protocol session. The values a and b can thus be viewed as
counters.
V P
νx
τ〈x〉
τ(x⊞h)
(x)
〈x⊞h〉
Figure 1: Hancke-Kuhn protocol: Second Stage
In the second stage, Peggy and Victor both form the hash h = H(s :: a :: b)
and proceed with the exchange on Fig. 1. If Victor’s challenge x = (xi) ∈ Zℓ2
is a bitstring of length ℓ, then the hash h should be 2ℓ bits long which we view
as a concatenation h = h(0) :: h(1) ∈ Z2ℓ2 of two strings of ℓ bits. The function
⊞ : Zℓ2 × Z
2ℓ
2 −→ Z
ℓ
2 is defined bitwise for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ by
(x⊞ h)i = h
(xi)
i (1)
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To summarize Fig. 1,
• Victor generates a random bitstring x of length ℓ, and sends each bit xi
of x at times τ i.
• To each bit xi, Peggy responds with h
(0)
i if xi = 0, and with h
(1)
i if xi = 1.
• Victor receives Peggy’s i-th bit response at time τ i. He knows h as well,
and can check that these responses are correct. If only he and Peggy know
h, then the responder must be Peggy. He then uses the times between
the sending the challenges and receiving the responses, together with the
velocity of the message signal, to compute his distance from Peggy.
2.3 Discussion
Leaking information to the attacker. The crucial component of the pro-
tocol is the Hancke-Kuhn function ⊞. Its main feature is that it is rapidly
computable, as efficiently as the exclusive or ⊕. It is thus as suitable for timed
authentication as ⊕, but it also leaks information, although less than ⊕: while x
and x⊕ g allow extracting g because g = x⊕x⊕ g, x and x⊞h allow extracting
only half of the bits of h. However, it is easy to see from (1) that from x, and
x ⊞ h, and moreover (¬x) ⊞ h, the attacker can extract all of h. That is why
Peggy and Victor must not reuse their counters. If h = H(s :: a :: b) can be
used in two responses, then an attacker can challenge Peggy twice, first with x
and then with ¬x, and thus get x⊞ h and (¬x)⊞ h as the two responses. From
this, he can extract h and impersonate Peggy to Victor. Even if the counters
are never reused, the fact that half of the response bits can be acquired by
an attacker needs to be carefully examined, and his chances to guess the rest
evaluated.
Overlooked assumption. Hancke and Kuhn’s estimate that the probability
that an attacker may succeed in impersonating Peggy is (34 )
|x| relies on the
implicit assumption that |x| ≤ |s|. Otherwise, if |x| > |s|, the attacker has
better odds to guess s than x. In practice, of course, the assumption |x| ≤ |s|
is usually satisfied, because the secret s is usually at least 256 bits long, while
the challenge x may be shorter. Strictly speaking, though, the impression that
protocol’s security only depends on the length of the challenge x is not correct,
since a short secret s would make it vulnerable.
Dishonest prover and the kernel. Another interesting weakness is that the
value of Peggy’s i-th response bit (x⊞ h)i does not depend on xi if h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i .
A dishonest Peggy can thus analyze the hash h and respond without waiting
for xi whenever h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i . If the response time is averaged, she is likely to
appear closer to Victor than she really is.
Since Victor’s counter b is predictable, Peggy can attempt to choose her own
counter a to maximize the size of the kernel κh of h = H(s :: a :: b), defined
κh = {i ≤ ℓ | h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i } (2)
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The larger the kernel, the closer Peggy can appear to Victor. However, the
problem of finding a value a such that, for a fixed s and b, the imageH(s :: a :: b)
has a desired property is a version of the range preimage problem [33]. The
assumption that H is a hash function, and in particular that it is a one-way
function, implies that dishonest Peggy’s advantage in finding a preimage a such
that H(s :: a :: b), given s and b, falls within a desired range of strings with a
large kernel, is negligible. This means that dishonest prover’s manipulation of
the kernel is unfeasible.
Further ad hoc observations get more complicated, without providing any
definite assurances. This demonstrates the need for a rigorous analysis within
a formal model.
Modeling the essence of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol. The assumption
that H is a one-way function will turn out to be the only point where the se-
curity of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol depends on computation. All other attack
strategies only involve guessing chances. To show this, in the following sections
we introduce a probabilistic (Bayesian) protocol model, which strictly extends
the standard algebraic (symbolic) model, and is a strict fragment of the stan-
dard computational model. The hash H is modeled as a randomized function,
as defined in Sec. 4. The perfect cryptography assumption of the symbolic
model lifts in our Bayesian model to the assumption that the hashes are truly
random, which is, of course, analogous to the random oracle assumption in the
computational model. It allows us to abstract away the generic and negligible
vulnerabilities, and to focus on the interesting aspects of the security of the
Hancke-Kuhn protocol, achieved in spite of the cryptographic weakness of the
⊞ function as it central feature.
3 Algebraic protocol models
We analyze the Hancke-Kuhn protocol by the derivational method. The varied
versions of this method have been applied to many protocols [17, 26, 8, 13, 12].
While the algebraic protocol model suffices in most cases, the Hancke-Kuhn
protocol requires an evaluation of guessing chances. We attempt to find a simple
model that will allow this.
3.1 Message algebras
In the Dolev-Yao protocol model, messages are represented as terms of a free
algebra of encryption and decryption operations [16]. More general algebraic
models allow additional operations, and additional equations [11]. Recall that
an algebraic theory is a pair (O,E), where O is a set of finitary operations (given
as symbols with arities), and E a set of well-formed equations (i.e. where each
operation has a correct number of arguments) [21].
Definition 3.1 An algebraic theory T = (O,E) is called a message theory if
O includes a binary operation of pairing 〈−,−〉, and the unary operations π1
7
and π2, such that E contains the equations π1(u, v) = u, π2(u, v) = v, and
((x, y) , z) = (x, (y, z)). A message algebra is a polynomial extension T [X ] of a
T-algebra T .
Remarks. The third equation implies that there is a unique n-tupling operation
for every n. The first two imply that the components of any tuple can be
recovered. A polynomial extension T [X ] is the free T-algebra generated by
adjoining a set of indeterminates X to a T-algebra T [21, §8]. The elements
x, y, z . . . of X are used to represent nonces and other randomly generated values.
This is justified by the fact that indeterminates can be consistently renamed:
nothing changes if we permute them. That is just the property required from
the random values generated in a run of a protocol1.
3.2 Protocol models
There are several protocol modeling formalisms that can be used for protocol
derivations. The process calculus in [17, 13] was designed specifically for this
purpose. Strand spaces [19] were designed for a different purpose, but they can
be adapted for protocol derivations too. In [26, 8, 28] we used partially ordered
multisets (pomsets) of actions [31], which allow simple tool support [2]. We stick
with this approach, but the subtle (or in some cases not so subtle) differences
between these approaches are of no consequence here. For completeness, we
provide a brief overview. For more detail, the reader may want to consult some
of the mentioned references.
In all cases, the set of actions A is generated over the message algebra T [X ]
by a grammar allowing each term t ∈ T [X ] to be sent in the action 〈t〉 ∈ A,
and received in the action (t) ∈ A. Moreover, an indeterminate x ∈ X can be
introduced into a protocol by the binding action (νx) ∈ A, which is read as
”generate fresh x”.
Challenge-response
Fig. 2 shows the abstract challenge-response protocol template, where the veri-
fier V ictor authenticates the prover P eggy. It is assumed that only Peggy is able
to transform the fresh challenge cV Px into the response rV Px. This assumption
is construed as a constraint on the operations cV P and rV P . The actions 〈〈t〉〉,
and ((t)) are syntactic sugar for “send (resp. receive) a message from which
anyone can extract t”.
1Of course, this is not the only requirement imposed on nonces and random values. The
other requirement is that they are known only locally, i.e. by those principals who generate
them, or who receive them unencrypted. This requirement is not formalized within the algebra
of messages, but by the binding rules of process calculus or actions by which the messages are
sent [13, 28].
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V P
νx
〈cV P x〉
(rV Px)
((cV Px))
〈〈rV P x〉〉
Figure 2: CR template
3.3 Views, derivability and guards
As usual, the communication channels are assumed to be controlled by the
attacker: she observes all sent messages, and controls their delivery. However,
she may not be able to invert all operations, and she has no insight into the
fresh or secret data of other principals. Hence the different views of the various
protocol participants.
A state σ reached in a protocol execution is a lower closed pomset of actions
executed up to that point, with an assignment of values to principals’ local
variables, which they use to store messages and their local computations. The
view ΓσP of a principal P at a state σ consists of all terms that P may have
observed up to σ, and all terms that she could derive from that. Formally, this
last clause means that ΓσP is upper closed under the derivability relation
Ξ ⊢ Θ ⇐⇒ ∀t ∈ Θ ∃ϕ ∈ O(n) ∃s1, . . . , sn ∈ Ξ. t
E
= ϕ(s1, . . . , sn) (3)
where Ξ,Θ ⊆ T [X ] are finite sets of terms, O(n) is the set of well-formed n-ary
operations in the signature O, and the equation is derivable from E.
Authentication by challenge-response
The challenge-response protocol in Fig. 2 validates authentication if Victor is
justified in drawing a global conclusion from his local observation: i.e., having
observed his own actions in on the left, Victor should have good reasons to
conclude that Peggy must have performed her actions on the right, and that all
these actions should be ordered as on the figure. Intuitively, this conclusion of
Victor’s can be justified by the assumptions that
1. anyone who originated the response rV Px had to previously receive the
challenge cV Px, which could only happen after Victor sent this challenge;
2. no one could produce rV Px without knowing the secret sV P , so it must
be Peggy.
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This last conclusion is based on the assumption that only Peggy knows sV P , or
only Peggy and Victor. In both cases, Victor’s reasoning is the same, because
he knows that he did not send rV Px.
Using the derivability relation, these informal justifications can be refined
into slightly more formal proof obligations in terms of (3), as follows. For any
set of principals Π, it is required that
1. whenever there is a derivation Ξ ⊢ rV Px, then there must also be a deriva-
tion Ξ ⊢ cV Px, for any set of terms Ξ observed by Π in a run of CR before
rV Px is sent;
2. whenever there is a derivation Ξ, cV Px ⊢ rV Px, then there must also be a
derivation Ξ, cV Px ⊢ sV P , for any set of terms Ξ known to Π in a run of
CR before rV Px is sent.
This type of authentication reasoning can be formalized using the notion of
guards from [28].
Definition 3.2 We say that a set of sets of terms G algebraically guards a
term t with respect to a set of terms Υ, and write G guards t within Υ if for all
Ξ ⊆ Υholds
Ξ ⊢ t ⇒ ∃Γ ∈ G. Ξ ⊢ Γ (4)
Explanation. We say that, in a context C, G guards t if every computation
path to t leads through some element of G. In other words, if Ξ allows computing
t, then it is ”because” it allows computing some of t’s guards from G.
Example. Let Υ = (DH) be the set of terms that may become known to the
participants and eavesdroppers of a run of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. Then{
{x, gy}, {y, gx}
}
guards gxy within (DH)
Note that gxy can be derived not only from {x, gy} and {y, gx} but also from
{g, x, y} and {g, xy}; however, neither of these sets can occur in a run of the
Diffie-Hellman protocol between two honest principals, so they are not contained
in the set Υ = (DH).
Definition 3.3 Let Q be a protocol run, and A a set of actions in Q. The term
context is the set
Q(A) =
⋃
P∈Π
ΓιP ∪ Γ
⊲A
P
where Π is the set of principals engaged in the run, ΓιP is the set of terms known
to a principal P initially, and Γ⊲AP is the set of terms known to P before any of
the actions a ∈ A are executed in Q.
Using the guard relation, we can prove that the challenge-response protocol
validates authentication.
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Theorem 3.4 Let Q be a run of the challenge-response protocol on Fig. 2.
Suppose that the functions cV P and rV P satisfy
{
{cV P x, sV P }
}
guards r
V P
x within Q(rV Px)
where sV P is a secret known only to Peggy (and possibly to Victor). Then Victor
is justified in drawing the following global conclusion from his local observations:
V : (νx)V ⊲ 〈c
V Px〉V ⊲ (r
V Px)V
=⇒
(
(νx)V ⊲ 〈c
V Px〉V ⊲ ((c
V Px))P ⊲ 〈〈r
V Px〉〉−→
P
⊲ (rV Px)V
)
(cr)
where the relation a ⊲ b says that action a occurs before action b, and 〈〈m〉〉−→
P
denotes the first time P sends message m after creating it.
The proof of this theorem is obtained by expanding the definition of the
guard relation and analyzing the term context of the challenge-response proto-
col. Several examples of reasoning with this relation can be found in [28].
Comment about perfect cryptography. The algebraic guard relation is
based on the assumption that a term can only be derived algebraically, using
the given operations and equations. A term t thus either lies in a subalgebra
generated by a set of terms Ξ, or not, and we have
Ξ ⊢ t ∨ Ξ 6⊢ t
This means that the attacks on the implementation of the term t are abstracted
away. In particular, we assume that it is impossible to cryptanalyze the bit-
strings representing t, and to derive t by accumulating partial information about
it. In other words, we assume perfect cryptography.
Moreover, we assume that the algebraic derivations Ξ ⊢ t only use the equa-
tions specified in the given algebraic theory T = (O,E). This means that the
message algebra T is assumed to be a free T-algebra, or that it is computation-
ally unfeasible for the attacker to find any additional equations that T satisfies,
not specified in the theory T, and to use them in his derivations. This is roughly
the pseudo-free algebra assumption [32].
Can we apply Thm. 3.4 to the Hancke-Kuhn protocol? The Hancke-
Kuhn protocol on Fig. 1 is obviously a timed version of the challenge response
template from Fig. 2, for which Thm. 3.4 provides a general security claim. If
the guard condition holds, then the Theorem yields the security of the Hancke-
Kuhn protocol.
In the algebraic model, the attacker at a given state either knows a term,
or not. As explained in Sec. 2, the attacker on the Hancke-Kuhn protocol may
always obtain half of the bits of the secret shared by Victor and Peggy by
challenging her. Does this mean that the attacker gets to know the secret? If
not, then the guard condition is satisfied. To apply Thm. 3.4, we should thus
set up the algebraic model so that a term is known only when all of its bits are
known.
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Howeber, the same security proof would also hold for a modified version of
the Hancke-Kuhn protocol, e.g. where x ⊞ h = h(0) if x = a and x ⊞ h = h(1)
otherwise, for some fixed a ∈ Zℓ2. The attacker still cannot algebraically derive
the term x ⊞ h without x, because this term still depends on x. The guard
condition holds, and thus the protocol is algebraically secure. In reality, though,
the attacker who always responds with h(1) will succeed with a probability
greater than 1 − 2−ℓ, assuming that the challenge x is drawn uniformly. The
algebraic security of the Hancke-Kuhn type of protocols is not very realistic.
4 Protocol models with guessing
In this section we propose a probabilistic refinement of the guard relation, which
captures and quantifies just the partial information leaks, like the one in the
Hancke-Kuhn protocol, without adding any unnecessary conceptual machinery.
4.1 Implementing and guessing messages
In order to reason about the feasibility of the algebraic operations on messages,
and about guessing, we consider the implementations of the messages t ∈ T in
an algebra Ω of strings, which carries the structure of a message T-algebra, and
moreover set of randomized functions.
For concreteness, we assume that Ω = Z∗2 is the set of bitstrings. However,
any graded free monoid would do, since the only operations that we use are the
concatenation and the length.
4.1.1 Implementing messages
Definition 4.1 Let H be a partially ordered set. We call an infinitely increasing
chain h0 < h1 < h2 < · · · in H a H-tower. We denote by H
ω the set of towers
in H.
Any free monoid Ω is partially ordered by the prefix relation
a ⊏ b ⇐⇒ ∃c ∈ Ω. a :: c = b
where a :: c can be viewed as the concatenation of the strings a and c. We call
Ω-towers streams. They are just infinite sequences of strings, strictly extending
each other: a stream is a sequence a = {aℓ}ℓ∈N ⊆ ΩN such that aℓ ⊏ aℓ+1 for
all ℓ. A stream a is called an ℓ-stream if the length of ℓ-th element is exactly
|aℓ| = ℓ. The set of streams through Ω is denoted by Ωω.
N can be viewed as the special case, since a natural number can be viewed
as a string of 1s. The set Nω consists of strictly increasing sequences of natural
numbers.
Definition 4.2 Let X be a set of indeterminates. Its strength is a map | − | :
X −→ Nω, assigning to each indeterminate x for each value of the security
parameter ℓ ∈ N the required length |x|ℓ ∈ N.
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An environment is a partial map η : X ⇀ Ωω such that |η(x)ℓ| = |x|ℓ
whenever η(x)ℓ is defined.
An implementation of a T-algebra T is an injective T-algebra homomor-
phism J−K : T ֌ Ωω.
An environment and an implementation induce a T-algebra homomorphism
J−Kη : T [Xη] −→ Ωω, where Xη ⊆ X is the domain of definition of η. We call
this homomorphism an implementation too whenever it is injective.
Explanations. The string η(x)ℓ ∈ Ω is the implementation of the indetermi-
nate x with the security parameter ℓ. The number |x|ℓ is the required length
of x for the parameter ℓ. The equation |η(x)ℓ| = |x|ℓ enforces this requirement.
Note that the function | − | on the left is the length of the string in Ω, whereas
the function | − |ℓ on the right is the part of the environment, specifying the
required length.
The implementation of the algebra T assigns a unique string to each term.
By definition of the polynomial algebra T [Xη], every algebra homomorphism
T −→ U to another algebra U , and a function Xη −→ U induce a unique
algebra homomorphism T [Xη] −→ U .
We assume that any implementation is effectively invertible, i.e. that it is
easy to recognize a term t from its implementation JtK.
Since any algebraic operation on Ω lifts to a pointwise operation over any
power Ωn, it also lifts to streams. So Ωω is also a T-algebra, and a monoid for
(elementwise) concatenation.2
Notation. When confusion seems unlikely, we ignore the difference between
the indeterminates x, y . . . ∈ X and their environment values η(x), η(y) . . . ∈ Ω.
4.1.2 Randomized functions
Consider the set of partial functions
R = {f : Ω × Ω ⇀ Ω |∀x∀ρ1∀ρ2.f(ρ1, a) ↓ ∧ f(ρ2, a) ↓ ⇒ |ρ1| = |ρ2|
}
where f(ρ, a) ↓ means that f is defined on ρ, a, and |ρ| is the length of the
bitstring ρ. The set R is a monoid with the following composition operation
f ◦ g(ρ2 :: ρ1, a) = f(ρ2, g(ρ1, a))
and with the function ι (o, a) = a as the unit, where o denotes the empty
string. We interpret the elements of R as randomized functions over Ω: the
first argument ρ represents the random seed, and the second argument a is the
actual input. The output fa can then be viewed as a random variable with the
probability distribution
Prob(fa = b) =
#{ρ | f(ρ, a) = b}
2r
(5)
2Grading is not an algebraic operation, and it does not lift: the length of each stream is
infinite.
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where r is the length of all ρ for which f(ρ, a) is defined. Leaving the seed
implicit, we denote randomized functions, as presented in R, in the form f :
Ω
R
−→ Ω.
Definition 4.3 A stream of functions is a sequence f = {fℓ}ℓ∈N ∈ RN which
is monotone, in the sense that for all streams a, ρ ∈ Ωω, at every ℓ ∈ N holds
fℓ(ρℓ, aℓ) ↓ ∧ fℓ+1(ρℓ+1, aℓ+1) ↓ =⇒ fℓ(ρℓ, aℓ) ⊏ fℓ+1(ρℓ+1, aℓ+1)
We denote the monoid of streams of functions by Rω.
4.1.3 Indistinguishability
Surviving the flood of negligible factors. Every subterm of every term
in every security protocol can in principle be guessed. Such probabilities are
usually tolerably small: they are negligible functions of some security parameter
ℓ. In probabilistic analyses, it is often convenient to ignore such events of neg-
ligible probability. In a protocol analysis, tracking all terms and subterms that
can be guessed with a negligible probability can lead to a lengthy list, without
revealing anything non-negligible. In this section, we provide an underpinning
for formal probabilistic reasoning up to negligible factors.
The frequencies of events are established by repeated sampling. The number
of samples needed for a reasonable estimate depends on a priori chance that
the event will occur. If this chance is 1 in n, then the number of the needed
sample is an increasing function of n.
When sampling a stream a = {aℓ}ℓ∈N, we assume that a reasonable amount
of samples should not be greater than q(ℓ), where q is a function from a rig3
Q ⊆ NN. In cryptography it is customary to take Q = N[x], the polynomials
with non-negative integer coefficients. Streams are thus sampled a polynomial
number of times. If the probability that the difference between aℓ and bℓ will
be detected in q(ℓ) samples remains small for all ℓ, then a = {aℓ}ℓ∈N and
b = {bℓ}ℓ∈N are considered indistinguishable. In other words, a and b are indis-
tinguishable if the probability that aℓ and bℓ are different is less than
1
q(ℓ) for
all q ∈ Q. Now we formalize this intuition.
Definition 4.4 A function ν : N −→ [0, 1] is said to be Q-negligible if it con-
verges to 0 faster than 1
q(ℓ) for all q ∈ Q, i.e.
∀q ∈ Q ∃n ∈ N ∀ℓ ≥ n. ν(ℓ) <
1
q(ℓ)
The set of Q-negligible functions is denoted by 1
Q
. The ordering on streams
a, b ∈ [0, 1]N is defined up to negligible functions, i.e.
a ≤ b ⇐⇒ ∃ν∀ℓ. aℓ + ν(ℓ) ≤ bℓ
3A rig Q is a ”ring without the negatives”: it consists of two commutative monoid struc-
tures, (Q,+, 0) and (Q, ·, 1), such that x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z and x · 0 = 0.
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We say that a, b ∈ [0, 1]N are Q-indistinguishable, and write a
Q
∼ b, if a ≤ b and
b ≤ a, or equivalently
a ∼ b ⇐⇒ ∃ν∀ℓ. |aℓ − bℓ| ≤ ν(ℓ)
Assumption, examples. For simplicity, we take Q to be the rig N[x] of poly-
nomials with non-negative integer coefficients, as it is usually taken in cryptog-
raphy. Then, e.g., for a = {2ℓ}ℓ∈N and b = {ℓ−2}ℓ∈N holds a ∼ 0, but b 6∼ 0,
where 0 is viewed as the constrant sequence.
Definition 4.5 Streams of functions f and g are indistinguishable if the se-
quences Prob(fa = b) and Prob(ga = b) are indistinguishable for all streams
a, b ∈ Ωω. We abbreviate
f ∼ g ⇐⇒ ∀ab ∈ Ωω. Prob(fa = b) ∼ Prob(ga = b)
Definition 4.6 A flow is an equivalence class of streams of randomized func-
tions. The flow monoid R˜ is thus
R˜ = Rω/ ∼
4.2 Probabilistic derivability
In contrast with the algebraic derivability relation from Sec. 3.3, the proba-
bilistic derivability relation does capture partial information leaks, using the
implementations of the terms. While Ξ 6⊢ Θ may happen because some t ∈ Θ
is not algebraically derivable from Ξ, it may be easy to guess many bits of in-
formation about Θ from Ξ. We formalize this by saying that for some stream
of randomized functions f ∈ R, Prob(fJΞK = JΘK) is high. By assumption, the
messages Θ are easily decoded from their implementations JΘK. So if some f is
likely to output JΘK on the input JΞK, then the chance to derive Θ from Ξ is
high. This is what we want to capture by the following randomized derivability
relation, which quantifies guessing chance.
Let X (Ξ) ⊆ X be the set of indeterminates that occur in Ξ. Any minimal
environment η in which the JΞKη is defined must be defined over X (Ξ). Since
for each ℓ the required number of bits for each x ∈ X (Ξ) is fixed to |x|ℓ, each
ηℓ must select the same number of bits
|X (Ξ)|ℓ =
∑
x∈X (Ξ)
|x|ℓ
So there are 2|X (Ξ)|ℓ environments to interpret Ξ for the security parameter
ℓ. Our chance to guess Θ from Ξ is the probability that a flow f ∈ R˜ will
output JΘKη when given the input JΞKη , for the random choices of η. Hence the
following definition.
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Definition 4.7 The guessing chance
[
Ξ ⊢ Θ
]
is the stream of probabilities
[
Ξ ⊢ Θ
]
ℓ
=
∨
fℓ∈R
#{ηℓ | fℓJΞKℓ = JΘKℓ}
2|X (Ξ,Θ)|ℓ
(6)
viewed up to indistinguishability.
We abbreviate
[
∅ ⊢ Θ
]
to
[
Θ
]
.
Comment. It is assumed that the guesser evolves: he keeps finding better and
better randomized functions fℓ, and thus computes the supremum in (6) as the
time goes by4.
Since the functions in the sequence {fℓ}ℓ∈N compute on streams JΞKℓ, to-
gether they form a stream of functions f ∈ Rω , i.e. a flow fJΞK = Θ.
Examples. For any closed term t ∈ T , i.e. such that X (t) = ∅, it holds that[
t
]
= 1. To see this, note that JtK is given in the empty environment η∅, and
thus X (t) = ∅ implies |X (t)|ℓ = 0 for all ℓ. By the assumption about R, for
every stream JtK ∈ Ωω, the constant function stream f() = JtK is feasible. The
supremum of (6) is reached at the constant function stream f() = JtK, and gives[
t
]
= #{η∅ | f()=JtK}20 = 1.
On the other hand, for every x ∈ X holds
[
x
]
ℓ
= 0. There are exactly 2|x|ℓ
environments ηx, defined on x alone. To guess x without any inputs, we need a
constant flow f , such that f() = JxK = ηx(x), i.e. a constant stream of functions
fℓ() = ηx(x)ℓ. Whichever f we may choose, exactly one environment ηx will
give f() = ηx(x). So for every constant flow f holds
#{ηx | f()ℓ=JxKℓ}
2|x|ℓ
= 1
2|x|ℓ
.
The supremum in (6) is thus reached for all constant f ∈ R˜, and
[
x
]
ℓ
= 1
2|x|ℓ
.
But the sequence
{
2−|x|ℓ
}
ℓ∈N
is indistinguishable from 0, as pointed out after
Def. 4.4.
4.2.1 Subbayesian reasoning and Advantage
Proposition 4.8 For all sets of terms Ξ,Γ,Θ holds[
Ξ ⊢ Γ
]
·
[
Ξ,Γ ⊢ Θ
]
≤
[
Ξ ⊢ Γ,Θ
]
(7)
When
[
Γ
]
> 0, it follows that
[
Γ ⊢ Θ
]
≤
[
Γ,Θ
][
Γ
] (8)
The inequalities become equalities if Ξ and Θ have no indeterminates in com-
mon.
4This kind of spontaneous optimization underlies dynamics of evolutionary processes in
general [25].
16
4.2.2 Advantage
Definition 4.9 The advantage provided by a set of terms Ξ in computing the
terms Θ is the value
Adv
[
Ξ ⊢ Θ
]
=
[
Ξ ⊢ Θ
]
−
[
Θ
]
When this advantage is zero, we say that Θ is flow independent of Ξ, and write[
Ξ⊥Θ
]
⇐⇒ Adv
[
Ξ ⊢ Θ
]
= 0 ⇐⇒
[
Ξ ⊢ Θ
]
=
[
Θ
]
4.3 Probabilistic guards
The idea of the guard relation is that a term t is guarded by one of the guards
from G if whenever t is derived, then at least one of the guards Γ ∈ G is also
derived. In the algebraic model, this was simple enough to state by Definition
3.2. When t can be guessed, then this crude statement needs to be refined:
the event that t is guessed must be preceded by the event that some Γ ∈ G is
guessed.
Definition 4.10 We say that a set of sets of terms G guards (against guessing)
a term t with respect to a set of terms Υ, and write G guards t within Υ if for all
Ξ ⊆ Υ such that Adv
[
Ξ ⊢ t
]
> 0 holds[
Ξ ⊢ t
]
≤
∨
Γ∈G
[
Ξ ⊢ Γ
]
·
[
Ξ,Γ ⊢ t
]
(9)
Explanation. In the algebraic case, (4) was an attempt to capture the intu-
ition that G guards t if all computational paths to t lead through some Γ ∈ G,
assuming the context C. The above definition extends this attempt to compu-
tational paths with guessing. If we get any help from Ξ to guess t, then that
help is not greater than the help we get from it to guess some guard Γ ∈ G of
t first, and then to guess t from this guard. Applied to message theories with
trivial implementations (e.g. with Ω = 1), Def. 4.10 boils down to Def. 3.2, in
the sense that the guessing chance is always constantly 0 or constantly 1, and
(9) reduces to (4).
Proposition 4.11 Suppose that the guessing machines F used in (6) are con-
strained to never read their random bits, so that guessing boils down to algebraic
derivations. Then the guessing guard relation from (9) boils down to the alge-
braic guard relation from (4).
To simplify notation, we elide the environment subscripts from J−Kη when-
ever η is inessential for the argument.
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5 Partitioned functions and ⊞
Notation. Whenever the confusion is unlikely, we abuse notation and denote
by x both the indeterminate x ∈ X and its implementation JxK = η(x) ∈ Ω.
In this section we analyze a class of quickly computable functions, like the
one used in the Hancke-Kuhn protocol. One way to ensure that a function is
quickly computable is to require that the bit dependency of its outputs from its
inputs must be partitioned: the i-th block of output bits should only depend
on the i-th block of input bits. Obviously, a function where every bit of output
depends on every bit of input has to wait for the last bit of input before it can
produce. Since in this section we are dealing with purely random input, our
results are presented in terms of streams, not flows.
Definition 5.1 We say that a boolean function f : Zm2 −→ Z
n
2 is partitioned
when
m = m1 +m2 + · · ·+mℓ
n = n1 + n2 + · · ·+ nℓ
f = f1 :: f2 :: · · · :: fℓ
where fi : Z
mi
2 −→ Z
ni
2 , for i = 1, 2, . . . ℓ are independent on the inputs and the
outputs of all other component functions, in the sense that
[
xı, fı(xı)⊥ fi(xi)
]
,
where ı = {j ≤ ℓ| j 6= i}.
Clearly, a boolean function receiving its input string sequentially can already
return the i-th block of its outputs while still receiving i+1st block of the inputs.
Unfortunately, this convenient property also decreases cryptographic strength
of the function, which requires that each bit of the output depends on each bit
of the input [39]. In particular, knowing a value f(z) of a partitioned function
increases the chance of guessing f(x). We make this precise in the next section.
5.1 Guessing partitioned functions
Proposition 5.2 (a) Let f be a randomized partitioned function, and let x, z ∈
Z
m
2 be fixed bitstrings with a common block xi = zi ∈ Z
n
2 . Then
[
x, z, f(z) ⊢ f(x)
]
≥
2n−m.
(b) Let f : Zℓ2 −→ Z
ℓ
2 be randomized bitwise partitioned, i.e. |mi| = |ni| = 1
for all i ≤ ℓ. Then
[
x, z, f(z) ⊢ f(x)
]
≥ 2−∆(x,z), where ∆(x, z) = #{i|x 6= z}
is the Hamming distance.
A consequence of Prop. 5.2 is that a proximity authentication protocol, im-
plemented using a partitioned function R to compute the response rV Px =
R(sV P , cV Px), cannot be secure in an absolute sense, because the response may
be guessed with a non-negligible probability from the other responses rV P z.
Moreover, it seems that the attacker can always obtain some other responses
rV P z by impersonating Victor and issuing challenges cV P z.
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Lemma 5.3 A randomized boolean function f : Zℓ2 −→ Z
ℓ
2 is bitwise partitioned
if and only if for every x ∈ Zℓ2 it holds that
f(x) = x⊞
(
f(0ℓ) :: f(1ℓ)
)
(10)
where ⊞ is the Hancke-Kuhn function (1), and 0ℓ, 1ℓ ∈ Zℓ2 are the strings of 0s
and 1s, respectively.
Bitwise partitioned functions with a minimal guessing probability can now
be completely characterized: they turn out to be precisely the Hancke-Kuhn
functions (1) for which the values at 0 and at 1 are independent.
Proposition 5.4 Suppose that f : Zℓ2 −→ Z
ℓ
2 is a randomized bitwise parti-
tioned function such that
[
x⊥ f(0ℓ) :: f(1ℓ)
]
. Then for fixed z and x ∈ Zℓ:[
x, z, f(z) ⊢ f(x)
]
= 2−∆(z,x) (11)
if and only if for every i ≤ ℓ it holds that[
fi(0)⊥ fi(1)
]
and
[
fi(1)⊥ fi(0)
]
(12)
Remark. In a sense, x⊞(−) : Z2ℓ2 −→ Z
ℓ
2 is thus a ”one-and-half-way function”,
since x⊞ h discloses only one half of the bits of h.
On the other hand, (−)⊞ h : Zℓ2 −→ Z
ℓ
2 is not only an example of a bitwise
partitioned function, satisfying the needs of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol, but it
is a canonical way to represent such functions.
5.2 Guessing x⊞ h
We now consider the probability of guessing x ⊞ h given various sorts of infor-
mation that may be learned in the Hancke-Kuhn protocol.
Definition 5.5 a) For x ∈ Zℓ2 and I ⊆ ℓ = {0, 1, 2, . . . ℓ−1} we define x
⊛I ∈ Zℓ2
to be the bit string obtained by replacing for all i ∈ I the bits xi with a “wild
card” ⊛
x⊛Ij =
{
⊛ if j ∈ I
xj otherwise
b) For h = h(0) :: h(1), where h(0), h(1) ∈ Zℓ2 we define the kernel κh to be the
set of places where its first and its second half coincide, e.g.
κh = {i ∈ ℓ | h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i }.
We make use of these definitions in the following.
Proposition 5.6 Suppose that h the concatenation of two constant ℓ-bit streams,
and x is a uniformly distributed ℓ-bit stream. Then
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(a)
[
h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
= 2|κh|−ℓ
(b)
[
x, h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
=
[
x⊛κh, h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
The following lemma concerns the problem of deriving x⊞ h from z ⊞ h for
some z.
Proposition 5.7 Let h be the concatenation of two uniformly distributed ℓ-bit
streams, let x be a uniformly distributed ℓ-bit stream, and let z be any ℓ-bit
stream. Then the following holds.
[
z ⊞ h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
=
[
z, z ⊞ h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
=
(
3
4
)ℓ
6 Security of Hancke-Kuhn
We quantify the security of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol by evaluating Prob(crp),
i.e. the probability that the sequence of events in a complete protocol run
validates the following reasoning of Victor’s
V : (νx)V ⊲ τ〈x〉V ⊲ τ (x⊞ h)V
=⇒
(
(νx)V ⊲ τ 〈x〉V ⊲ (x)P ⊲ 〈x⊞ h〉−→P ⊲ τ (x⊞ h)V
)
(crp)
corresponding to the run on Fig. 1. In order to evaluate this probability, we
analyze the probability that (crp) fails. How can it happen that Victor observes
a satisfactory sequence of his own actions
V = (νx)V ⊲ τ 〈x〉V ⊲ τ (x⊞ h)V (13)
but that the desired run
O = τ〈x〉V ⊲ (x)P ⊲ 〈x⊞ h〉−→P ⊲ τ (x⊞ h)V (14)
did not take place? There are just two possibilities:
A: the responder does not know the secret s, i.e. he is the Attacker,
E: the responder knows the secret s, i.e. he is Peggy, but the response is sent
Early, without receiving the challenge.
The remaining case, that the responder is Peggy, and she responds to the chal-
lenge, is just the event O. Thus ¬O = A ∪ E . It follows that
Prob(crp) = Prob(O|V) = 1− Prob(A ∪ E|V)
≥ 1− Prob(A|V)− Prob(E|V) (15)
The (in)security of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol thus boils down to evaluating
Prob(A|V) and Prob(E|V). The following lemmas and propositions show that
these probabilities are negligible. The proofs are in the Appendix.
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Response token. Recall that Peggy’s response token h = H(s :: a :: b) is
derived from the shared secret s, Peggy’s counter a, and Victor’s counter b, using
a secure public hash function H . In this section, h abbreviates H(s :: a :: b).
Assumption 6.1 The above decomposition of ¬O as A ∪ E is valid only if
h = H(s :: a :: b) is such that
• |s| ≫ |x|, i.e. attacker’s chance to guess the secret s is negligible compared
with his chance to guess the challenge x;
• the counters a and b are never reused (although they may be predictable).
Otherwise, the attacker may guess h, and ¬O may not be covered by A ∪ E .
6.1 Guards in undesired runs
In order to evaluate Prob(crp), we need to determine the probability that the
correct response x⊞ h is guessed in the undesired runs A and E . Towards this
goal, we explore what can be guessed in the term contexts (cf. Def. 3.3) A(x⊞h)
and E(x). The following lemmas simplify this question.
Lemma 6.2 (a) Let A be an attack run with a long term secret s, Peggy’s
counter a, Victor’s counter b, and Attacker’s challenge z, for which he obtains
the response z⊞h, where h = H(s :: a :: b). Then for any Ξ ⊆ A(x⊞ h) it holds
that [
Ξ ⊢ x⊞ h
]
=
[
Ξ ∩ {s, a, b, x, z, z ⊞ h} ⊢ x⊞ h
]
(b) Let E be a run with a long term secret s, Peggy’s counter a, Victor’s
counter b, and where Peggy responds early. Then for any Ξ ⊆ E(x) it holds that[
Ξ ⊢ x⊞ h
]
=
[
Ξ ∩ {s, a, b} ⊢ x⊞ h
]
Lemma 6.3 For h = H(s :: a :: b) and Υ ⊆ {z, z ⊞ h} it holds that[
x⊞ h
]
ℓ
=
[
x, z ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
= 2−ℓ (16)[
a, b, s, x⊛κh ⊢ x⊞ h
]
= 1 (17)[
a, b, s, x,Υ ⊢ x⊞ h
]
= 1 (18)
Proposition 6.4 {{s}, {z ⊞ h}} guards x⊞ h within A(x ⊞ h)
Proposition 6.5
{
{x⊛κh}
}
guards x⊞ h within E(x)
The guards displayed in the preceding Propositions will now be used to
evaluate Prob(V|A) and Prob(V|E), i.e. the probabilities that the authentica-
tion may fail because the Attacker breaks it, or because Peggy’s succeeds in
responding Early.
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6.2 Bounds on undesired runs
Proposition 6.4 and the definition of probabilistic guards say that, for a given
challenge x, the probability that an Attacker can violate authentication is
bounded above by [
Φ ⊢ s
]
·
[
Φ, s ⊢ x⊞ h
]
or by[
Φ ⊢ z ⊞ h
]
·
[
Φ, z ⊞ h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
where Φ = {a, b, z, z⊞h}. The first quantity is clearly negligible. We must show
the same for the second.
Likewise, Proposition 6.5 implies that the probability that Peggy can respond
Early is bounded above by[
s, a, b ⊢ x⊛κh
]
·
[
s, a, b, x⊛κh ⊢ x⊞ h
]
Note that in the attack run A, the Attacker cannot learn x until after she has
created z. The distribution of z is thus independent from that of x.
Proposition 6.6 Suppose that the Attacker, before receiving Victor’s challenge
x, can pick her own challenge z and obtain a single response z ⊞ h. Then the
stream of expected probabilities Prob(V|A) that the Attacker can deceive Victor
by guessing x⊞ h is indistinguishable from the stream of probabilities p defined
by
pℓ =
∑
x∈Zℓ
2
2−ℓ
[
x, z, z ⊞ h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
=
(
3
4
)ℓ
This means that Prob(V|A) is negligible.
Proposition 6.7 The stream of expected probabilities Prob(V|E) that Peggy can
deceive Victor by guessing and sending her response before she receives the chal-
lenge is indistinguishable from the stream q defined by
qℓ =
∑
h∈Zℓ
2
∑
x∈Zℓ
2
2−ℓ
[
h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
=
(
3
4
)ℓ
This means that Prob(V|E) is negligible.
Note in particular that this means that in both cases the stream of prob-
abilities is indistinguishable from zero, since the stream
(
3
4
)ℓ
is itself indistin-
guishable from zero.
The final result is obtained by putting Propositions 6.4 and 6.6 together.
Theorem 6.8 Suppose that the Hancke-Kuhn protocol is realized in such a way
that it satisfyes 6.1, and does not always fail for trivial reasons: i.e., there
are some sessions with an honest prover Peggy and an honest verifier Victor.
Formally, this means that there are C,D ∈ (0, 1) such that
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• Prob(A),Prob(E) < C, i.e. not every response is from an Attacker, or
too Early,
• Prob(V) > D, i.e. Victor sometimes observes a satisfactory run and
accepts.
Then Prob(crp) is indistinguishable from 1. In other words, the Hancke-Kuhn
protocol achieves authentication almost certainly.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a framework for extending algebraic cryptographic models
to probabilistic models and used it to construct a probabilistic extension of the
Protocol Derivation Logic. We have illustrated it by applying it to an analysis of
the Hancke-Kuhn distance bounding protocol. We expect that it will be useful
in the analysis of many other protocols that rely on weak cryptography to take
advantage of non-standard communication channels.
We should also point out that the potential applications of our framework go
far beyond purely probabilistic extensions. The main thing that needs to be done
to make our framework applicable to computational models is to define a notion
of feasibly computable functions, so that guessing probability can be defined in
terms of feasible function streams instead of all possible function streams. We
have defined such a notion and are currently investigating its applications to
protocols. In future work, we expect to present a more general framework that
can incorporate a wide range of methods of cryptographic reasoning.
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A Appendix: The Proofs
Proof of Prop. 4.8. Let fℓ and gℓ be randomized functions. Consider the sets
F = {χℓ | fℓJΞKχℓ = JΓKχℓ} and G = {ηℓ | gℓJΞ,ΓKηℓ = JΘKηℓ}.
Claim 1. If for x, y ∈ X (Ξ,Γ) and ηℓ such that gℓJΞ,ΓKηℓ = JΘKηℓ holds
ηℓ(x) = ηℓ(y), then for η̂ℓ, which is equal to ηℓ everywhere except on
η̂ℓ(x) 6= η̂ℓ(y), holds that ĝℓJΞ,ΓKη̂ℓ = JΘKη̂ℓ, for ĝ modified accordingly.
(Intuitively, separating two pieces of input can only provide more infor-
mation, not less.)
Claim 2. If fℓJΞKχℓ = JΓKχℓ} and dom(χℓ) ⊆ dom(ηℓ), with χℓ(x) 6= χℓ(y) ⇒
ηℓ(x) 6= ηℓ(y), then fℓ can be precomposed with a permutation to yield f̂ℓ
with dom(f̂ℓ) ⊆ dom(ηℓ) and f̂ℓJΞKηℓ = JΓKηℓ}.
The consequence of these claims is that we can modify fℓ and gℓ to f̂ℓ and ĝℓ
so that #F = #F̂ and # = Ĝ.
Now let hℓ(x) = fℓ(x) :: gℓ(x :: y). Since thus
hℓJΞKηℓ = (fJΞKηℓ) :: (g (JΞKηℓ :: fJΞKηℓ)) = JΓ,ΘKηℓ
holds, we have
#{ηℓ | fℓJΞKℓ = JΓKℓ}
2|Ξ,Γ,Θ|ℓ
·
#{ηℓ | gℓJΞ,ΓKℓ = JΘKℓ}
2|Ξ,Γ,Θ|ℓ
≤
#{ηℓ | hℓJΞKℓ = JΓ,ΘKℓ}
2|Ξ,Γ,Θ|ℓ
The inequality
[
Ξ ⊢ Γ
]
·
[
Ξ,Γ ⊢ Θ
]
≤
[
Ξ ⊢ Γ,Θ
]
follows by observing that
#{ηℓ | fℓJΞKℓ = JΓKℓ}
2|Ξ,Γ,Θ|ℓ
=
#{χℓ | fℓJΞKℓ = JΓKℓ}
2|Ξ,Γ,|ℓ

Proof of Prop. 5.2. For (a), xi = zi yields fi(xi) = fi(zi), so we only need to
guess at most n− ni bits. For (b), xi and zi are bits, and n−∆(x, z) of them
are equal, so we only need to guess at most ∆(x, z) bits. 
Proof of Lemma 5.3. (f(x))i = fi(xi) =
(
x⊞
(
f(0ℓ) :: f(1ℓ)
))
i
holds by
the definition of bitwise partitioned functions at the first step, and by (1) at the
second step. 
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Proof of Prop. 5.4. Assumptions (12) say that
xi 6= zi =⇒
[
xi, zi, fi(zi) ⊢ fi(xi)
]
=
[
xi ⊢ fi(xi)
]
On the other hand, by definition, the components of a partitioned function are
mutually independent. Hence
[
x, z, f(z) ⊢ f(x)
]
=
ℓ∏
i=1
[
x, z, f(z) ⊢ fi(xi)
]
=
ℓ∏
i=1
xi 6=zi
[
xi ⊢ fi(xi)
]
=
∏
∆(z,x)
1
2
= 2−∆(z,x)
The other way around, using (11) at the second step, we get
ℓ∏
i=1
[
x, z, f(z) ⊢ fi(xi)
]
=
[
x, z, f(z) ⊢ f(x)
]
= 2−∆(z,x)
=
ℓ∏
i=1
xi 6=zi
[
xi ⊢ fi(xi)
]
which, with the componentwise independence, yields (12). 
Proof of Prop. 5.6. Note that for each i ∈ κh, the bit (x ⊞ h)i = h
(0)
i = h
(1)
i
does not depend on xi. This means that x⊞ h only depends on x
⊛κh. 
Proof of Prop. 5.7. Guessing x⊞h from z and z⊞h can be modeled as a version
of the Monty Hall problem [36], where Monty randomly selects x and h and the
contestant chooses z. Monty then announces z ⊞ h and the contestant guesses
x⊞ h.
Since the bits of x⊞ are independent, it is enough to consider the case ℓ = 1.
Monty then flips three fair coins to pick the secret bits x, h(0), and h(1), while
the contestant picks a bit z. Monty then announces z ⊞ h = h(z). Should the
contestant now guess that x⊞h = z⊞h, or should he switch to x⊞h = ¬(z⊞h)?
Denote by q the probability that the contestant picks x⊞h = z⊞h. If h(0) =
h(1), the contestant wins with this choice, because the value x ⊞ h is the same
for every x. Since h(0) and h(1) were randomly chosen, Prob(h(0) = h(1)) = 12 .
Otherwise, if h(0) 6= h(1), then x⊞ h = z ⊞ h holds if and only if x = z. Since x
is random, Prob(x = z) = 12 , and hence Prob(h
(0) 6= h(1) ∧ x = z) = 14 , because
h(0), h(1) and x are independent.
The probability that the contestant will make a correct guess is thus
q ·
(
Prob
(
h(0) = h(1)
)
+ Prob
(
h(0) 6= h(1) ∧ x = z
))
=
3q
4
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To maximize this probability, the contestant needs q = 1, and should thus stick5
with Monty’s bit z ⊞ h.
The proof for
[
z ⊞ h ⊢ x ⊞ h
]
differs just in the detail that z is not chosen
by the contestant, but obeys some unknown distribution. However, x is still
independent of z. Thus for some p, Prob(x = z) = Prob(x = 0) · Prob(z =
0) + Prob(x = 1) · Prob(z = 1) = 12p+
1
2 (1− p) =
1
2 . 
Proof of Lemma 6.2(a). By assumption, the outputs of the hash function H
are indistinguishable from random strings, and thus satisfy
[
H(u)⊥H(v)
]
for
all u 6= v.
Recall that A(x ⊞ h) is the union of the contexts observed by the possi-
ble participants in the run A, before x ⊞ h is known. Besides s, known by
Victor and Peggy, and a, b and x, announced publicly but never reused, the
context A(x⊞ h) thus also contains a single additional challenge z, issued by
the Attacker, and the corresponding response z ⊞ h (provided by Peggy before
she receives Victor’s challenge x).
Moreover, the Attacker may issue a family Y ⊆ Zℓ2 of additional challenges
to Peggy, and construct a list {by}y∈Y of the future values of Victor’s counter.
To each new challenge, Peggy will respond with y ⊞ hy, where each response
token hy = H(s :: ay :: by) is derived using a new value of the counter ay. By
assumption,
[
hy ⊥ h
]
holds for all y. Independently of the distance of Y and
the challenge x, the responses y ⊞ hy will provide no information about x ⊞ h.
In summary, the term context A(x ⊞ h) is thus
{s, a, b, x, z, z ⊞ h} ∪ {y, ay, by, y ⊞ hy | hy = H(s.ay.by) ∧ y ∈ Y }
for some Y ⊆ Zℓ2, where a : Y → Z
ℓ
2 is injective, and b : Y → Z
n
2 arbitrary. The
assumption about H implies
[
y, ay, by, y⊞hy ⊥ x⊞h
]
, which further tells that
for any Ξ ⊆ A (x⊞ h)
{s, a, b, z, z ⊞ h} ∩ Ξ = ∅ =⇒
[
Ξ ⊥ x⊞ h
]
and we are done.
The proof of 6.2(b) is analogous, but slightly simpler, elaborating the fact
that obtaining one challenge tells nothing about another one. 
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Since h is indistinguishable from random, the bits of any
hℓ are indistinguishable from independent. The probability of guessing any
chosen substring of length ℓ in h is indistinguishable from 2−ℓ. In particular,
the probability of guessing xℓ ⊞ hℓ for a chosen xℓ is indistinguishable from
2−ℓ. Knowing which substring is being guessed presents no advantage, and thus[
xℓ ⊢ xℓ ⊞ hℓ
]
= 2−ℓ.
Equations (17) and (18) follow from Prop. 5.6. 
5This solution is in contrast from the original Monty Hall problem [36], where it is advan-
tageous to switch. The reasoning is, however, quite similar.
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Proof of Prop. 6.4. The claim follows from the fact that each set Ξ ⊆ A(x ⊞ h)
such that Adv
[
Ξ ⊢ x⊞ h
]
> 0 satisfies at least one of the following inequalities:[
Ξ ⊢ x⊞ h
]
≤
[
Ξ ⊢ s
]
·
[
Ξ, s ⊢ x⊞ h
]
(19)[
Ξ ⊢ x⊞ h
]
≤
[
Ξ ⊢ z ⊞ h
]
·
[
Ξ, z ⊞ h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
(20)
According to Lemma 6.2(a) for each subset Ξ of A(x ⊞ h) such that a ∈ Ξ, it
suffices to consider the set Ξ∩{s, a, b, x, z, z ⊞ h}. Once the problem is reduced
this far, the rest follows by case analysis, using Lemma 6.3. 
Proof of Prop. 6.5. The claim is that each Ξ ⊆ E(x) such that Adv
[
Ξ ⊢ x⊞h
]
>
0 satisfies [
Ξ ⊢ x⊞ h
]
≤
[
Ξ ⊢ x⊛κh
]
·
[
Ξ, x⊛κh ⊢ x⊞ h
]
(21)
Lemma 6.2(b) says that it suffices to consider Ξ∩{s, a, b} if a ∈ Ξ. Thus, we only
need to consider the subsets of {s, a, b}, and since b is deterministic, this reduces
to the subsets of {s, a}. The assumption that the stream h is indistinguishable
from random implies
[
Ξ ⊢ x⊞h
]
ℓ
= 2−ℓ whenever Ξ is a proper subset of {s, a}.
So (21) holds trivially in that case. For Ξ = {s, a}, using Prop. 5.6 and Lemma
6.3, we have
[
Ξ ⊢ x ⊞ h
]
ℓ
=
[
Ξ ⊢ x⊛κh
]
ℓ
= 2|κh|−ℓ and on the other hand[
Ξ, x⊛κh ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
= 1. Hence (21). 
Proof of Prop. 6.6. Since Prob(x ∈ Zℓ2) = 2
−ℓ by assumption, and
[
x, z, z ⊞
h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
= 2−∆(z,x) by (11), it follows that
∑
x∈Zℓ
2
2−ℓ
[
x, z, z ⊞ h ⊢ x ⊞ h
]
ℓ
= 2−ℓ ·
ℓ∑
i=0
(
ℓ
i
)
2−i = 2−ℓ ·
3ℓ
2ℓ
=
(
3
4
)ℓ

Proof of Prop. 6.7. By hypothesis the token h = H(s :: a :: b) is indistin-
guishable from a random value. Since
[
s, a, b⊥ x
]
also holds by assumption,[
s, a, b ⊢ x⊞h
]
=
[
h ⊢ x⊞h
]
follows, because s, a, b can only be useful to derive
h = H(s :: a :: b). But Prop. 5.6(a) then implies that
[
s, a, b ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
= 2i−ℓ,
where i = |κh|. The expected value that Peggy will guess x ⊞ h are averaged
over the possible values of h, and hence
∑
h∈Zℓ
2
∑
x∈Zℓ
2
2−ℓ
[
h ⊢ x⊞ h
]
ℓ
= 2−ℓ ·
ℓ∑
i
(
ℓ
i
)
2i−ℓ = 2−2ℓ · 3ℓ =
(
3
4
)ℓ

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Proof of Thm. 6.8. By (15), to prove the Theorem, it suffices to show that
both Prob(A|V) and Prob(E|V) are negligible. The Bayes’ Theorem and the
hypotheses imply
Prob(A|V) =
Prob(V | A) · Prob(A)
Prob(V)
≤
Prob(V | A) · C
D
Since Prob(V|A) is negligible by Prop. 6.6, Prob(A|V) is negligible too. The
fact that Prob(E|V) is negligible follows in the same way from Prop. 6.7. 
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